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WITHHOLDING & ATTACKING SSBNS
by
James J. Tritten
Attacks against strategic missile-carrying submarines is one
of the most interesting and controversial topics for students of
navies, deterrence, war fighting, war termination, and arms
control. The concept involves the cutting edge of submarine and
antisubmarine warfare technologies and techniques, the potential
for uncontrolled or unwanted escalation during the conventional
phase of a war, some extremely difficult command and control
issues, and a potential new area for arms control between the
superpowers. Such operations, often called "strategic
antisubmarine warfare," also offer us one of the finest examples
of the complex interaction between nuclear and non-nuclear
warfare.
The issue of attacking strategic missile-carrying nuclear
submarines, however, involves more than just the two superpowers.
First, three other nations have such warships: China, France, and
the United Kingdom. Second, a significantly larger number of
nations have antisubmarine (ASW) forces that might be positioned,
capable, and potentially involved in military operations against
the five nations of the world who currently have submarines
carrying strategic ballistic or cruise missiles. Canada, for
example, may join the ranks of nations with nuclear-powered
submarines (SSNs) that will routinely deploy in some of the ocean
areas where strategic missile-carrying submarines operate.
This prospect of a multitude of nations potentially
conducting strategic ASW and thus upsetting deterrence reinforces
the Soviet concept of "equal security" : The USSR claims that in
order to have the same level of security as enjoyed by the United
States, the USSR must have a defensive capability against all
possible enemies.
There are those who would argue that nuclear weapons have no
military utility and serve only to deter war. But nuclear
weapons, like any military hardware, do have warfighting
potential in case deterrence fails. Many people argue that
deterrence is what prevents war from breaking out. Deterrence,
however, is only a theory and opinions differ as to what best
deters. In general, deterrence is thought to be credible when
one nation is convinced that another nation has both the
capability to perform a defending or punishing act in response to
an attack and the political will to actually do so.
There are two major schools of deterrence theory. The first
says that you best deter war by having the capability to
passively and actively prevent an enemy from achieving his goals
and objectives. Soviet ballistic missile, air, and civil
defenses are examples of passive actions that nations take to
prevent damage to their homeland. Modern Soviet offensive
ballistic missiles that can strike Western air, submarine, or
missile bases before the allies could use them are examples of
active "defenses" that support this theory of deterrence.
The second major theory is that deterrence is served best by
having the capability to punish an aggressor if he breaks the
peace. The latter theory is also described as a "minimal" or
"assured destruction" theory of deterrence; i.e., one need not
field sufficient forces to prevent an aggressor from damaging
one's homeland but merely a minimal force that can retaliate
with offensive forces even if forced to absorb a first strike.
If shared by two nations, this second theory of deterrence
is known as "mutual assured destruction" or MAD. The unilateral
dismantling by the U.S. of its single ballistic missile defense
site in the 1970s and similar U.S. actions taken to virtually
eliminate passive air and civil defenses are actions compatible
with "mutual" assured destruction. Unfortunately Soviet retention
and expansion of active and passive defenses, suggests they do
not accept the "MAD" theory of deterrence.
Whether one accepts warfighting, minimal deterrence, or MAD
as the preferred theory of deterrence, there seems to be general
agreement that in any case, a nation must have a
survivable/secure reserve force capable of striking back, even if
subjected to a well coordinated and surprise first strike. This
reserve retaliatory force must also be perceived by the other
nation as having the credible capability of conducting a second
strike that would matter; something must be threatened that is of
value to the nation to be deterred.
Manned bombers were the first strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles. Older bombers and associated supporting tankers have
become, unfortunately, relatively easy to destroy before they
take off or while they are attempting to penetrate air defenses.
Similar problems exist for new ground-launched cruise missiles
(GLCMs). Over the years, credibility decreased that older manned
bombers could successfully penetrate massive Soviet air defenses.
This led to improvements in bomber systems, the development of
GLCMs, and eventually to the use of air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs) launched from bombers outside these defenses. Such air-
breathing bomber and cruise missile forces could be used for a
strategic nuclear reserve.
Bombers offer the advantage of being able to provide a
nuclear reserve force that is capable of being recalled before
actual weapons employment and re-cycled for additional follow-on
strikes. Mobile GLCMs with extremely long ranges are only
recently becoming possible. The Soviet lack of investment in
dedicated intercontinental air-breathing forces over the years is
one indication that they appear more comfortable with other
delivery systems for deterrence.
Ballistic missiles in hardened silos could be used for a
reserve force. Despite the many fine attributes missiles in
fixed silos (e.g., prompt counter-military potential), their
relative vulnerability to attack makes them ill-suited for such a
secure reserve role. With the advent of longer range mobile
ballistic missiles, nations will have to consider whether or not
these land-based systems ought to be a part of the secure reserve
force that is expected to survive an enemy first strike or is to
be used/withheld from own initial nuclear strikes.
Traditionally, nations have looked to navies to provide
strategic nuclear delivery systems that can survive enemy attacks
and threaten nuclear retaliation if the peace is broken. Western
strategist often argue that it is the knowledge that despite the
relative vulnerability of land-based missiles and the problems in
penetration by air-breathing systems, sufficient warheads remain
on undetected submarines on patrol to constitute a threat so
powerful that no nation would risk making the first strike. Sea-
based nuclear forces have thus been described in the West as
constituting the final deterrent force.
Navies first deployed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)
to perform this function. The U.S. Navy performed deterrent
patrols with Regulus guided missile submarines (SSGs) and surface
ships well before the appearance of the Polaris system. As
technologies permitted, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
were developed and married to submarines. The Soviet Union first
fired a ballistic missile from a diesel-electric submarine (SSB)
in 1955. Later both superpowers developed nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The Soviet Union also
built nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs) capable
of carrying SLCMs that can be used against shore targets.
As SLBM ranges improved, submarines did not have to sail
close to an enemy's shorelines in order to threaten his homeland.
Extremely short-ranged SLCMs were discarded by the U.S. in favor
of longer range ballistic missiles. Early Soviet missiles that
required a submarine to surface to fire were replaced by more
advanced models that could be launched from under the surface.
Some Soviet Yankee SSBNs carrying SS-N-6 and SSGNs have, however,
continued their pattern of patrolling off the shores of Western
nations
.
The SS-N-8 Sawfly missile, first deployed in 1972, gave the
USSR the unilateral advantage of being able to deploy other SSBNs
close to its own shoreline and still threaten targets in North
America. These protected home areas have been termed "bastions"
by Western analysts. There is ample literature, hardware, and
exercise evidence to support the contention that this was the
preferred method of Soviet deployment for the bulk of its navy in
i
the past and recent present.
An interesting asymmetry developed between Western and
Soviet navies. The U.S., French, and Royal Navies retained the
shorter range Polaris, Poseidon, M-20 and M-4 missiles and relied
on stealth to provide security for their SSBNs on patrol. The
Soviet Navy, on the other hand, deployed its newer submarines in
bastions with a protective array of air and sea power and
favorable geography to ensure that its forces retained their
"combat stability" (mission capability)
.
All nuclear-capable nations could feel relatively secure
that no matter what happened during the conventional phase of
war, or despite the use of some of one's own missiles, a
"sufficient" amount of nuclear forces would remain at sea to
credibly threaten an enemy. No nation would likely be forced
into a position that it felt its sea-based nuclear force should
be used early in a war because it might be lost due to combat
actions taken against it.
Some analysts in the West assumed that each of the two major
superpowers would withhold some or most of its SLBMs from any
first strike to constitute a nuclear reserve force. In an era of
SALT and detente, they then mirror-imaged doctrine and strategy
and assumed that the Soviet SS-N-8 missile was developed for such
a reserve role.
Although this makes interesting discussion, there is no
direct evidence in Soviet military or naval literature that
supports such a strategy for withholding once a war enters its
nuclear phase. To the contrary, direct Soviet literature evidence
is that once a war goes nuclear, it does so on a global and
massive basis. There is some latent evidence to support
withholding but it is extrapolated from reading between the
lines. Such evidence is extremely thin and inconclusive.
There are obvious benefits to withholding a secure reserve
force even after a nuclear war starts. These primarily involve
the potential benefits for securing better terms during the
termination phase of a war by retaining a credible nuclear threat
that can perform militarily significant missions against one's
opponent. Hence nations have been and are still interested in
refining the capabilities of their SLBMs and SLCMs to allow
greater direct military utility; e.g. hard-target kill, rather
than only threaten non-precision targets.
Also, it is doubtful that the Soviet military could ever
allow one service, especially the fifth-ranked navy, to be "the"
decisive branch of combat arms in the event of war. As is well
known, Soviet military strategy is a combined arms approach to
warfare in which all major branches are given a role in
influencing the "outcome" of the war. There simply is no direct
evidence in Soviet military literature that either the Navy or
sea-based nuclear systems will be the force that directly
influences the outcome of a future war. Allowing the Navy to
constitute the only nuclear reserve is decidedly non-Russian.
Another problem with the theory of withholding sea-based
missiles from a nuclear first strike is that older SLBMs and
shorter-range SLCMs deployed off the coasts of enemy nations can
perform unique damage limitation missions. For example, Soviet
SS-N-6 Serb missiles aboard Yankee submarines are capable of
striking U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases much more quickly
than can intercontinental range land-based ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) launched from the USSR itself or SLBMs from protected
bastions. Similarly, sea-based systems deployed in the rear
oceanic areas of Europe may allow the Soviets to circumvent the
loss of SS-20 Saber missiles dismantled as part of the new INF
Treaty.
Soviet submarines on patrol off the coasts of Europe, Japan,
and North America are also much more vulnerable to ASW operations
during the conventional phase of war. For example, Soviet SS-N-5
Sark missiles found on Golf-II diesel-electric submarines
homeported in the Baltic and Soviet Far East are probably very
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susceptible to ASW actions, including actions by nations outside
the NATO alliance. For reasons then of military utility and lack
of survivability, it is very likely that some sea-based systems
have a role in a first nuclear strike.
If these shorter-range sea-based systems were to be a part
of a secure nuclear reserve, then the Soviets should have
withdrawn them to more protected home waters where they could be
withheld to present a subsequent escalatory threat if surge
deployed close to enemy shores. Instead, by keeping them in
relatively exposed forward areas, we must conclude that they are
positioned to be used quickly as part of a combined arms attack
in the event of war, or that the Soviets have a high regard for
their survivability. It could also mean that they serve only a
pre-war political role and are either expendable in time of
combat or would be repositioned.
Another theory that has been suggested is that the USSR
intends to hide these units in the territorial and perhaps inland
2
waters of neutral nations. This option would certainly present
both unique challenges to the militaries of such nations as well
as to NATO. What should be the response of the allies, for
example, if they detected Soviet SSBs in neutral waters?
With a large portion of Western SSBNs deployed in the deep
ocean expanse and the possibility that some or even most of these
carry warheads for the nuclear reserve force, Soviet military
theoreticians and spokesmen have openly stated that destruction
of enemy sea-based nuclear assets is a strategic goal for the
Soviet military and a main mission of the Soviet navy in the
3
event of a future war. Such statements when coupled with
aggressive ASW programs and other actions taken to reduce
homeland vulnerability to attack further , reinforce the
contention that the USSR has never accepted "mutual" assured
destruction. Fortunately for the West, Soviet strategic ASW
capabilities have never matched their aspirations.
Simply put, to the Soviet military planner it is better to
strike an enemy submarine during the conventional phase of a war
and destroy perhaps hundreds of warheads before they launch than
to allow that threat to exist. For example, the destruction of
even one Ohio class SSBN armed with Trident C-4 missiles could
perhaps result in the loss of 192 allied nuclear warheads.
Performing this type of damage limitation mission is totally in
conformance with Soviet military strategy for deterrence.
The Soviet theory is that having the capability to alter the
correlation of forces by sinking Western strategic missile-
carrying submarines on the high seas during the conventional
phase of a war will both deter nuclear escalation by NATO in the
event of war and also limit damage to the Soviet homeland if the
war goes nuclear anyway. There is no literature evidence
demonstrating Soviet fear that nuclear escalation might result
from such operations; i.e. they apparently do not anticipate that
the allies would initiate nuclear warfare over the loss of
strategic missile-carrying submarines during the conventional
phase of a war.
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NATO and U.S. declaratory maritime strategies now also
include the possibility of offensive action against Soviet
strategic missile-carrying submarines during the conventional
4phase of war. The reasons are essentially the same as those
espoused by the Soviets. A strong and additional side benefit to
the Allies is that if the Soviets are tied up defending their
bastions, then only minimal residual forces may be available for
open-ocean strikes against vital allied sea-lines of
communication ( SLOCs )
.
Actually attacking a missile-carrying submarine is a far
more difficult task than is generally given credit by civilian
analysts and academics unfamiliar with salt water ASW operations.
One must assume, however, that submarines deployed near an
enemy's antisubmarine forces are more likely to be destroyed than
those who try to avoid them. Forward-based submarines are prime
targets for enemy navies since they represent not only a nuclear
threat but also could provide vital attack assessment and other
intelligence information and because they have a conventional
torpedo and missile capability. Additionally, every submarine
sunk during the initial stages of a war is one less that can be
re-used if reloaded.
The West has manipulated the USSR for years with an implicit
threat of conventional attack against their homeland in the event
of a future war. One can only speculate on the effect of a few
conventional SLCMs on the populations of Japan, France, the U.K.
or the U.S. even if such weapons were employed only against
military targets in the coastal regions. It seems that a prudent
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planning assumption one should make before a war is that any
enemy submarine found off one's shores is a potential threat that
should be neutralized in the event of armed conflict with that
enemy nation. Whether it carries nuclear or conventional
munitions is irrelevant.
Attacking enemy submarines in actively defended bastions
will likely be extremely difficult and will doubtless involve a
high cost. If the benefits of such actions, however, are
substantial, then one must assess the commensurability of
benefits to costs. For example, if France or the United Kingdom
took every possible precaution to ensure survivability of their
sea-based nuclear forces during the conventional phase of a war,
but the Soviets were able to destroy them anyway, then France or
the U.K. might not have any nuclear "cards" to play during war
termination and therefore might not participate. Such a major
political result might be worth the cost of a few, albeit high
cost, Soviet ASW units.
One of the major issues now being raised is that with
improvements in technology, the Soviets might elect to send the
majority of their strategic missile-carrying submarines into the
deep oceans instead of keeping them in bastions. Such action
would circumvent the problem of having their fleet tied up on
defense rather than on offensive operations against the West.
Whether survivability of Soviet strategic missile-carrying
submarines would be enhanced by such deployments is dependent
upon advanced submarine and ASW technologies and the penchant for
control of nuclear weapons exercised by the Kremlin. It would be
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more Russian to retain nuclear weapons close to home in bastions
than it would to allow them to hide independently in the open
ocean.
Another option is to deploy submarines in restricted waters
such that for geographic, military, political, and legal reasons,
other nations would find it more difficult to actually conduct
offensive ASW operations. Tom Clancy raised such a possibility
in his fictional Red Storm Rising when Soviet SSBNs deployed in
the White Sea.
Choosing to achieve survivability of a reserve force by
stealth alone has proven successful for the West now for some
thirty years. Deploying submarines in waters such as the White
Sea would offer the Soviet Union the opportunity to hide
submarines beyond narrow straits whose access is relatively easy
to control. This type of deployment might make up for
deficiencies in submarine and ASW technology.
Additional political and legal implications would certainly
impact on Western decision-making, e.g. should the allies conduct
naval operations in enemy home waters during conventional war?
Or during a limited war when the action thus far is confined to a
distant theater?
Some of these restricted waters are claimed by the USSR as
either closed seas, historic bays or seas, or internal waters.
The Sea of Okhotsk is a case in point, having been referred to in
the past as a "closed sea" by Soviet jurists. It has also been
acknowledged as an area for Soviet SSBN deployments. The similar
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principle of the historic bay is recognized in the West with
Britain's Bristol Channel, Canada's Hudson Bay and Strait, and
the U.S. Chesapeake Bay as examples.
Whether or not the Sea of Okhotsk is actually a "closed
sea," or what the legal significance is of such statements, it is
clear that the Soviets attach more importance to areas of the
seas that are close to its shores than they do the high seas.
They may be likely to react to attacks within such areas in a
different manner than attacks on forward deployed units
.
Similarly, Canada or the U.K. would probably react more strongly
to attacks conducted on shipping in the Hudson Bay or Bristol
Channel. In other words, horizontal escalation from warfare
ashore to war at sea may have a number of "rungs" in that ladder.
Similarly, the White Sea is claimed as internal waters by
the USSR. While other nations have not accepted the exact line
behind which the White Sea is internal waters, there is a certain
portion of the White Sea that clearly is internal waters and not
part of the territorial sea. Internal waters are afforded a
special legal status as the legal equivalent of land; i.e. ships
from other nations do not have the right of innocent passage
through them in time of peace. Ships do have certain rights of
innocent passage in the territorial sea.
During wartime, such as during the Vietnam war, nations
often find it more difficult to authorize even conventional
offensive military operations within an enemy's or a neutral
nation's internal waters just as they take a significant step
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when they attack targets on or invade a nation's land mass. Are
there other areas of the world that nations might want to use to
hide their strategic missile-carrying submarines? If sea-based
nuclear forces primarily constitute a nuclear reserve, there is
no requirement that they routinely patrol within missile range of
their assigned targets.
These geographic, military, political, and legal
ramifications serve to illustrate the ratchet effect possible
through horizontal escalation at sea. Nations may be expected to
react differently if one of their naval or merchant ships is
attacked well out on the high seas, closer to their own shores,
within the territorial seas, or within internal waters
themselves. Simply imagine the difference if the nations of the
world were losing tankers and other ships within sight of their
own shores rather than in the on-going limited war in the Persian
Gulf.
Additional political and legal aspects of strategic ASW have
been raised with suggestions that arms controls regulate such
potential operations. Proposals to restrict deployments of
strategic missile-carrying submarines and parallel limitations on
ASW have been around since the Brezhnev era. Even former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter favored such an approach. More recently,
these ideas have been once again raised in the Western literature
and suggested by Soviet Communist Party Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev in his October 1987 speech in Murmansk.
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Most of these proposals would attempt to create "safe" zones
for the deployment of strategic missile-carrying submarines. All
ASW operations would be restricted within them. Other proposals
include limits on strategic ASW technological development. Even
if one could verify compliance with such measures , the net effect
would be more beneficial for the Soviet Union than for the West.
Simply put, the Soviets would be allowed to restrict Western
naval operations in vast areas of the high seas while, at the
same time, the West would be required to identify the areas of
the ocean in which its strategic missile-carrying submarines
deploy. The latter would be a major contribution to the solution
of the Soviets' ASW search problem.
If we try to think through such a possible arms control
agreement, verification problems abound. For example, if the
West could demonstrate that the Soviet Union was not in
compliance with the agreement, but could only do so by exposing
sophisticated technical or intelligence capabilities, then might
it also be likely that someone would argue against exposing the
violation at all?
Attempting to regulate strategic ASW technology without
similar restrictions on operational or tactical ASW is obviously
not practical nor in the allies' best interests. If successful
execution of NATO defense strategy continues to depend upon the
reinforcement/resupply of Europe from North America in the event
of conventional war, then the allies will continue to require
advanced ASW techniques to get the convoys through. The Warsaw
16
Pact can fight in Europe without reliance on vulnerable SLOCs and
might therefore be in a better position to absorb ASW technology
restrictions. The West cannot afford to gamble on surrendering
its lead in ASW technology by agreeing to any restrictions in a
future arms control regime.
Given all of the major policy issues surrounding the
potential withholding of sea-launched missiles in the event of a
war and the possibility of conducting strategic antisubmarine
warfare, what should Western policy be for procuring new weapons
systems and for war planning? Although one might like to be
prepared for all possible threats, governments are more likely to
prepare only for "more likely" or even "best" case assessments
than they are against the "worst" case. The exception has been
that in the U.S., every Secretary of Defense since Robert
McNamara has openly stated that nuclear forces should be sized to
retailiate even in the face of a first strike.
Thus procuring forces that can perform defensive strategic
ASW in high threat environments seems to be a good idea even if
that capability is expensive. If deterrence were to fail, such
forces could actually do something that is militarily
significant. Attacking enemy strategic missile-carrying
submarines during the conventional phase of a war is exactly what
the Soviets say they will do, and it is matched by the evidence
that they are not only developing such forces, but also give
research and development in this area a high priority.
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Having such an ASW capability does not necessarily undermine
deterrence but rather parallels it by reinforcing the notion that
deterrence is best served by a credible capability to prevent an
enemy from achieving his own war aims. We should always
remember that it is the Soviets that the West wants to deter and
to do so means taking steps that they respect. Having a credible
capability to limit damage to one's homeland in the event of war
is a principle that the Soviets obviously respect.
It follows that any attempt to regulate deployments of
strategic missile-carrying submarines or strategic ASW in the
absence of a comprehensive nuclear and conventional arms
limitation regime is a bad idea. The price to be paid by the
West would include probably less security for its own sea-based
nuclear forces, less opportunity to be prepared for critical
battles in the event of war, and significantly reduced
opportunities for the gathering of intelligence (a part of our
national technical means of verification of existing arms control
agreements )
.
Attempts to regulate ASW technology would only undermine our
operational and tactical needs such as convoy and battle group
defense. Restrictions on strategic ASW operations in wartime
also is a bad idea since it would deny navies the opportunity to
conduct otherwise legitimate and lawful military operations.
In the event of a war, attacking an enemy force before he
attacks you is sound militarily. Attacking enemy nuclear capable
forces may also make good military sense. The numbers of
18
strategic missile-carrying submarines of all types as well as
air-breathing and land-based weapons systems in the Soviet
inventory make it unlikely that the West could actually ever
attrite sufficient numbers to deplete the Soviet strategic
5
nuclear reserve in its totality. The loss of a submarine at sea
is not likely to "require" a nation's political leadership to
seek overwhelming retribution through nuclear escalation.
On the other hand, the opportunity to reduce large numbers
of enemy nuclear forces in the event of war is one that should be
taken. Soviet SSBNs, SSBs, SSGNs, and SSGs should not be placed
on a list of targets that require authorization to attack once
armed conflict commences. The Soviets will attempt to attack
our forces; we should attack theirs. Every submarine destroyed
will reduce the number of warheads whose use could be threatened
by the Soviet Union during the conventional phase, or would be
used in actual nuclear combat operations, or could be
threatened/used during the termination phase of a future war.
Deterrence through both active and passive defense is a
concept with which navies should be very comfortable. Armor has
been added to men of war as part of damage control systems.
Active anti-aircraft defenses attempt to shoot down missiles and
aircraft before they strike the ship. Aircraft have extended the
ASW protection envelope of convoys and battle groups. Strikes
against enemy airfields are seen as an integral part of fleet air
defense.
19
Attacking the enemy's main battle fleet is naval tradition
and a principle of operational naval warfare since Alfred Thayer
Mahan. Even Karl Von Klausewitz claimed that to decide a war,
nations must attack centers of gravity. Developing the forces
that can sail into the teeth of the enemy is expensive but if
this serves deterrence, no price is too great.
It is not likely that any nation will make the political
decision to escalate to nuclear warfare due to actions that are
taken against its fleet at sea, even if the units damaged or sunk
are strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. No matter how much we
talk before war about the need for arms control and reductions in
military expenditures, during a war that same political
leadership will demand from its military that actions be taken
that will result in as favorable a set of terms of war
termination as can be achieved. Altering the nuclear correlation
of forces by attacking an enemy's submarines is the type of step
that can help. Defense of one's homeland is a morally acceptable
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